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This paper is about self-consciousness and how it figures in David Foster Wallace’s
Infinite Jest. Because Infinite Jest is such a large novel (1079 pages, including the indispensable
footnotes), it serves, like other large novels before it, as a kind of encyclopedia of contemporary
culture.1 The novel, in large part, treats self-consciousness—a distinctly human phenomenon,
one which certainly accounts for our dominance as a species—as a problem (on both an
individual and collective level) that needs to be overcome. This is because, as it turns out, self
consciousness, when it becomes epidemic, is as much a boon as it is a blow to the species.
This paper will unfold in five sections. The first section introduces the problem of selfconsciousness as one of the chronological starting points of Infinite Jest, showing its centrality to
the work as a whole. The second section expands this problem in relation to Wallace’s apparently
conservative version of postmodernism. Sections three, four, and five explore the problem
through detailed close readings of the text, showing some of its richness as well as drawing
attention to some of its ramifications.

1. Freedom and The Problem of Self-consciousness
Infinite Jest’s opening episode, in which Hal waggles during his admission interview at
the University of Arizona, is actually the novel’s last episode chronologically. As Stephen Burn
shows, the novel’s storyline actually begins in 1933, when James Incandenza’s father injures
himself playing tennis while his own father (that would be Hal, Mario, and Orin’s great-

For Stephen Burn, Infinite Jest appears near the end in a line of “encyclopedic” novels written
in the twentieth century. This line includes James Joyce’s Ulysses (1922) and Finnegan’s Wake
(1939), William Gaddis’s The Recognitions (1955) and JR (1975), Thomas Pynchon's Gravity's
Rainbow ( 1973 ), and Don DeLillo's Underworld ( 1997) (19).
1
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grandfather) looks on (82). The two episodes are closely related, however, like opposite ends of a
family history: the episode in 1933 sets up an important theme, what I term, the problem of selfconsciousness, which sheds light on Hal’s situation almost a century later. 2 The goal of this paper
is to trace the problem of self-consciousness through the course of the novel, to see how this
works.
Along the way, I will show how Wallace uses the problem of self-consciousness to
critique what the novel presents as a particularly American and modern view of freedom, a view
that fails to recognize what Steeply terms, “the hazards of being free.”
Self-consciousness is, in a literal sense, a state of mind; put simply, I take it to be the act
of recognizing oneself as a self. More abstractly though, self-consciousness figures in Infinite
Jest as the site of one’s perpetual confrontation with oneself; it is where self-doubt festers, a kind
of psychological wasteland, from which the novel’s many characters, almost all of them drug and
alcohol addicts, are trying to escape. For the Incandenza men, it is a problem passed from one
generation to the next, almost like a disease.
One’s inability to escape this wasteland is paradoxical: after all, if you are trapped inside
your head—if you cannot, but wish you could ignore, as Wallace puts it, “the constant
monologue inside your head” (This Is Water, 50)—you are not really trapped at all; you are only
inwardly conflicted, and this conflict persists and is even exacerbated the more you think about
it. Self-consciousness is, in this way, a self-perpetuating condition; in a way, it is a matter of will.
Which means solving the problem of self-consciousness has something to do with changing the
2 As

Burn shows, the last episode of the novel, chronologically, is Hal’s admission interview at
the University of Arizona, Year of Glad (2010). See “Appendix: The Chronology of Infinite Jest”
(81) in A Reader’s Guide to Infinite Jest.
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way you think—which, to be sure, is not an easy pill to swallow: no one wants to be told how to
think.
But Wallace wants to challenge us on this point. Sometimes freedom—or rather, freedom
as we commonly conceive of it—works against us. Sometimes a person can have too much of it.
This may, on the face of it, offend our modern liberal sensibilities, but it is an idea
featured throughout Infinite Jest. Having too much freedom is in fact how Marathe characterizes
the American people, all of whom would apparently rather die watching the samizdat unendingly
than live without it. He compares the American people to a child whose father “cries out
‘Freedom!’ and allows his child to choose only what is sweet, eating only candy, not pea soup
and bread and eggs, so his child becomes weak and sick.” In other words, if Americans are
addicted to the pleasures of entertainment, it is because they—like the child gorging herself on
candy—lack a kind of fatherly guidance. “How to choose any but a child’s greedy choices,” he
asks Steeply, “if there is no loving-filled father to guide, inform, teach the person how to choose?
How is there freedom to choose if one does not learn how to choose?” (320).
On this point Steeply argues that Americans do not need or want a state-sponsored
program, or something like this, “to paternalistically do their thinking and choosing for
them” (321). “These things you find so weak and contemptible in us,” he argues, “these are just
the hazards of being free” (320). But perhaps the “hazards of being free” are greater than Steeply
realizes. Left alone to their devices, human beings tend to make bad decisions; this is a basic
premise of the novel. “Not all compulsion comes from without,” Marathe warns; a person may
be politically, or even physically free, but psychologically (maybe even spiritually) a slave to
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their baser instincts and desires; in such a case, a person may very well need someone or
something to “paternalistically do their thinking and choosing for them.”
In my close reading below I will show how the logic of Hal’s suffering—a suffering
passed on to him from his father and father’s father—reflects this predicament; Marathe is in fact
describing a cultural condition that figures in the lives of the Incandenza men. It is important that
Marathe refers to fatherly guidance here, because paternalism is closely linked with the problem
of self-consciousness in the course of the novel. If Marathe’s diagnosis of American society is
correct, Americans, it seems, are more in need of (fatherly) guidance than they want to admit or
realize.

2. Wallace’s Postmodern Conservatism
James K.A. Smith argues that Wallace’s work, often offhandedly categorized as
postmodern, is in fact a kind of hybrid, stylistically postmodern but expressing a decidedly antinihilistic moral sensibility, which accounts for what he terms Wallace’s “postmodern
conservatism.”
Although Wallace’s early work, particularly his first novel, The Broom of The System
(1987), clearly trafficked in the postmodern hijinks the postmodern literary fathers, such as
Barthelme and Pynchon, are known for—“literature that exposed and undercut the very
mechanisms of story-telling”—by the time he published Infinite Jest (1996) it was no longer
enough, for Wallace, that a novelist point out the arbitrariness and constructedness of the stories
and ideologies people believe to make sense of modern life; rather, the novelist should also offer
a meaningful, if not hopeful, way forward out of the rubble of disillusionment.
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Smith points to a now famous interview Wallace had with Larry McCaffery three years
before Infinite Jest’s publication, in which he argued,
[W]e’d probably most of us agree that these are dark times, and stupid ones, but
do we need fiction that does nothing but dramatize how dark and stupid
everything is? In dark times, the definition of good art would seem to be art that
locates and applies CPR to those elements of what’s human and magical that still
live and glow despite the times’ darkness. Really good fiction could have as dark
a worldview as it wished, but it’d find a way both to depict this world and to
illuminate the possibilities for being alive and human in it. (Conversations, 26)
Here, Wallace indicates what Smith deems the “moral purpose of his fiction,” and the basis for
the “postmodern conservatism” Smith sees in his work; that good fiction should actually care
about the reader’s well-being, helping her explore what it means to be human in an age that is in
many ways dehumanizing.
For Smith, that Wallace thinks a distinctly human way of life is even worth exploring—
indeed, that there might even be a distinctly human way of life—is evidence that he has a kind of
faith, in literature and in life, in a way that makes him, though not necessarily religious,3 still a
firm anti-nihilist; he is willing to search for meaning where there is supposed to be none. This
sensibility governs his work so that, as much as his fiction “documents a world of almost

To be sure, Wallace himself explains he is not moralizing here or reflecting on a set of religious
beliefs. “This isn’t that it’s fiction’s duty to edify or teach, or to make us good little Christians or
Republicans,” he explains, “I’m not trying to line up behind Tolstoy or Gardner. I just think that
fiction that isn’t exploring what it means to be human today isn’t art” (26).
3
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suffocating immanence, a flattened human universe where the escapes are boredom and
distraction,” this world is never completely left alone:
[T]here is a persistent hint that Wallace is spooked, that his world is haunted. His
characters are anything but satisfied with what late modern capitalism has to offer,
and so we see regular glimpses of what [Charles] Taylor calls the “nova effect”—
new modes of being that try to forge a way through, even out of, the crosspressured situation where immanence seems ready to implode upon itself.
So if the modern age is, as Taylor suggests, an age of “disenchantment” (A Secular Age, 25),
Wallace seems determined to re-enchant his fictional worlds in a way that signals a kind of
wishful thinking on his part—a nostalgia for a time when human kind still believed in, if not
God, then, at the very least, transcendent experiences. This, I think, accounts, in part, for
Wallace’s participation in what Adam Kelly terms “the New Sincerity in American Fiction.”

3. The Problem of Self-Consciousness: A Close Reading
James Incandenza’s father (who remains nameless) is a lover of tennis who, in 1960, is
determined to instill in young James, age ten, a similar love for the game, convinced that James
will be a truly great player. As James goes to open their garage door so they can retrieve their
equipment, his father corrects him:
Jim not that way Jim. That’s no way to treat a garage door, bending stiffly down at
the waist and yanking at the handle so the door jerks up and out jerky and hard
and you crack your shins and my ruined knees, son. Let’s see you bend at the
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healthy knees. Let’s see you hook a soft hand lightly over the handle feeling its
subtle grain and pull just as exactly gently as will make it come to you. (157)
James is careless opening the garage door: James’ father explains that James has learned this
kind of carelessness by following his mother’s example—“Your mother is a shover and a
thruster, son. She treats bodies outside herself without respect or due care”—and he explains that
she herself learned it, along with her whole generation, by following Marlon Brando’s example:
She was in love from afar with this fellow Brando, son. Who? Who. Him, Marlon
Brando was the archetypal new-type actor who ruined it looks like two whole
generations’ relations with their own bodies and the everyday objects and bodies
around them. No? Well it was because of Brando you were opening that garage
door like that, Jimbo. (157)
Here it seems that James’ carelessness with the garage door is symptomatic of a more
fundamental problem: his father implies that the generations influenced by Brando (James’
mother’s generation and James’ own generation) do not relate to their bodies (and the everyday
objects and bodies around them) the way they should; this is why James opens the garage door
the way he does. To understand what his father means by this, it is helpful to recognize Brando’s
cultural significance.
According to James’ father, Brando—by “leaning back on his chair’s rear legs, coming
crooked through doorways, slouching against everything in sight, trying to dominate objects,
showing no artful respect or care, yanking things toward him like a moody child and using them
up and tossing them crudely aside so they miss the wastebasket and just lie there, ill-used. With
the overclumsy impetuous movements and postures of a moody infant”—depicted a new
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character type on screen, i.e. “the new archetypal tough-guy rebel and slob type,” as he terms it,
whose demeanor and manner James’ mother and her generation appropriated for their own use,
but to their detriment:
She may have loved Marlon Brando, Jim, but she didn’t understand him, is what’s
ruined her for everyday arts like broilers and garage doors and even low-level
public-park knock-around tennis. Ever see your mother with a broiler door? It’s
carnage, Jim. It’s to cringe to see it, and the poor dumb thing thinks it’s tribute to
this slouching slob-type she loved as he roared by. Jim, she never intuited the
gentle and cunning economy behind this man’s quote harsh sloppy unstudied
approach to objects. (158)
That is, James’ mother and her generation never understood that Brando himself was not actually
“sloppy,” his approach to objects was not “unstudied”; his sloppiness—indeed, his whole “toughguy rebel and slob type” demeanor—was, after all, part of his performance as an actor.
Here I think James’ father makes indirect reference to Brando’s particular acting method.
Brando is known for popularizing “Stanislavski's system,” an acting methodology taught by the
Russian theatre director Konstantin Stanislavski, from which the American “Method acting” was
later adapted. According to Burnet Hobgood, Stanislavski’s system teaches that acting is “the art
of experiencing in performance” (149); the actor’s central task is to think like, to emotionally
identify with, the character’s imagined personality:
When an actor experiences a role, Stanislavski believed, the fully realized
personality of the character so dominates the occasion that the actor’s own
personality virtually disappears. A fusion (sblizhennia) merges actor with
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character and, for the moment makes it irrelevant to the spectator that the actor
has an identity other than that of the character. The surest means to this end comes
when the actor learns how to align his psyche with the imagined psyche of the
dramatic character, for then an authentically organic process of creation can
happen. (150)
Stanislavski therefore opposed acting that relied on replicating stereotypes, in which “the player
observed experienced actors and copied their manner and gestures” (148), in favor of acting that
sought “sincere expression” (151).
To the extent that he acted according to this method, Brando, I think one can say, acted in
earnest, becoming his characters, so that any of his characters’ affectations—i.e. sloppiness,
carelessness, etc.—would manifest almost unconsciously. In this sense, his affectations are not
affectations at all; he is not trying to appear sloppy or careless, because he is not trying to mimic
some pre-existing character type. His choices are born of Stanislavski’s “authentically organic
process of creation.” And this is what James’ mother, so keen on paying “tribute to this slouching
slob-type,” does not understand:
She never… never sees that Marlon Brando felt himself as a body so keenly he’d
no need for manner. She never sees that in his quote careless way he actually
really touched whatever he touched as if it were part of him. Of his own body.
The world he only seemed to manhandle was for him sentient, feeling. (158)
Brando had no need for manner—that is, he had no need to consciously put on airs—because
when he acted, he wholly identified with his character; his physical gestures, his overall
demeanor, corresponded naturally with his character’s state of mind.
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In this way, James’s father believes that Brando performing on camera is much like a
high-level tennis player performing in front of a crowd:
She never saw that Brando was playing the equivalent of high-level quality tennis
across sound stages all over both coasts, Jim, is what he was really doing. Jim, he
moved like a careless fingerling, one big muscle, muscularly naïve, but always,
notice, a fingerling at the center of a clear current. That kind of animal grace. The
bastard wasted no motion, is what made it art, this brutish no-care. His was a
tennis player’s dictum: touch things with consideration and they will be yours;
you will own them; they will move or stay still or move for you; they will lie back
and part their legs and yield up their innermost seams to you. Teach you all their
tricks. He knew what the Beats know and what the great tennis player knows, son:
learn to do nothing, with your whole head and body, and everything will be done
by what’s around you. (158)
For James’s father, high-level tennis operates on an almost mystical plane; top players wield a
kind of power on the court so that objects (like the ball, presumably) “move or stay still or move
for you.” A player who can do this is “muscularly naïve” in the sense that his movements are,
just as Brando’s movements were, instinctual; in this way he “learn[s] to do nothing, with [his]
whole head and body,” in the sense that his head—a metonymy for “mind”—is not actively
thinking about what his body is doing; his head simply is his body. Tennis thus orients the self
inside the body so that one’s mind and body become one.
Perhaps the best way to characterize James’ mother’s generation, from James’ father’s
perspective, is to say their heads float outside their bodies. From outside their bodies they look at
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themselves as they would in a mirror and are, in this way, preeminently self-conscious, in a way
that great tennis players must not be. To the extent that self-consciousness is a function of an
overactive mind, James is liable to think this way (with his head floating outside his body),
because he is highly intelligent. James’ father thus admonishes him:
[Son], its just neural spasms, those thoughts in your mind are just the sound of
your head revving, and head is still just body, Jim. Commit this to memory. Head
is body. Jim, brace yourself against my shoulders here for this hard news, at ten:
you’re a machine a body an object, Jim … (159)
This, then, is James’ father’s creed: head is body. When head is body the mind is not selfconscious; it does not drift about or look inward.
To underscore his point, he explains to James that he himself failed to abide by this creed
the day his own tennis career effectively ended at the age of thirteen. He was playing against the
son of one of his father’s clients, and this was the first day his own father (James’ grandfather)
ever came to watch him play a competitive match. “And was I nervous, young sir J.O.I?” he asks
James rhetorically, referring to his father’s presence there,
I was not. I was in my body. My body and I were one. My wood Wilson from my
stack of wood Wilsons in their trapezoid presses was a sentient expression of my
arm, and I felt it singing, and my hand, and they were alive, my well-armed hand
was the secretary of my mind, lithe and responsive and senza errori, because I
knew myself as a body and was fully inside my little child’s body out there, Jim, I
was in my big right arm and scarless legs, safely ensconced, running here and
there, my head pounding like a heart … (165)
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James’ father was by his (James’ father’s) own estimation perfectly fit and ready, physically and
mentally, for the match, his head so much a part of his body—“safely ensconced” inside—that it
“pound[ed] like a heart.”
He was, thus, in the course of “handing the dandy his pampered ass,” when it all went
wrong—when his father’s client, who knew too little of tennis etiquette to keep quiet from the
sideline, remarked to his father, “Good godfrey Incandenza old trout but that lad of yours is
good” (166), and James’s father, hearing this remark and wondering how his father would
respond, while simultaneously reaching for a ball hit just out of reach, slipped and fell to the
ground.
As he is quick to note, it was not his body that betrayed him in that moment; it was he
(read: his mind) who betrayed his body:
Jimmer, I may well have betrayed that fine young lithe tan unslumped body,
Jimmer I may very well have gotten rigid, overconscious, careless of it, listening
for what my father, who I respected, I respected that man, Jim is what’s sick, I
knew he was there, I was conscious of his flat face and filter’s long shadow, I
knew him, Jim. (167)
When he hears the client’s remark and cannot help but anticipate his father’s response, his head,
up until this point securely in his body, drifts (metaphorically, I am suggesting) outside it.
Desiring his father’s approval and respect, he listen’s for his father’s response and becomes
“overconscious”: his attention shifts, if only slightly, from the game to himself.
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His falling to the ground and the injury he suffers thereafter reinforces this point; he
becomes acutely aware of himself, particularly as a body; he sees himself as a fixed point in the
world:
It was a religious moment. I learned what it means to be a body, Jim, just meat
wrapped in a sort of flimsy nylon stocking, son, as I fell kneeling and slid toward
the stretched net, myself seen by me, frame by frame, torn open. (169)
In this moment he watches himself—his mind floating there outside his body—as if on a movie
screen, “frame by frame, torn open.” In becoming aware of himself as a body, he experiences a
kind of religious humiliation, from which, if his alcoholism later in life is any indication, he
never recovers; the lesson here is that understanding the need to abide by the creed, head is body,
may signal one’s very inability to do so, because one cannot remain, strictly speaking, willfully
naïve; once he becomes “overconscious” of his body he cannot undo it. This, I think, is what
causes him to drink; to become unconscious of one’s self may require a kind of self-forgetting4—
perhaps a kind of self-anihilation—which is only made possible, in this case, with alcohol:
It’s a pivotal, it’s seminal, religious day when you get to both hear and feel your
destiny at the same moment Jim. I got to notice what I’m sure you’ve noticed long
ago, I know, I know you’ve seen me brought home on occasions, dragged in the
door, under what’s called the influence, son, helped in by cabbies at night, I’ve
seen your long shadow grotesquely backlit at the top of the house’s stairs I helped
pay for, boy: how the drunk and the maimed both are dragged forward out of the
If James’ father’s alcoholism is his best attempt at self-forgetting, James’ own alcoholism is
likely a similar attempt. It is especially telling that James Incandenza commits suicide by
sticking his head inside a microwave oven.
4
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arena like a boneless Christ, one man under each arm, feet dragging, eyes on the
aether. (169)
The reference to Christ suggests a Biblical allegory: James’ father’s fate seems analogous
to the fate of Adam and Eve in Christian mythology, who eat the forbidden fruit from the Tree of
the Knowledge of Good and Evil: with the knowledge of Good and Evil they become selfconscious and are subsequently made irreversibly aware of their nakedness and feel ashamed for
the first time. Jungian psychologist Jordan Peterson writes, “This is why Adam and Eve became
ashamed, immediately after their eyes were opened. They could see—and what they first saw
was themselves” (50). So mankind’s fall from Grace corresponds with the moment it becomes
newly self-aware. James’ father also experiences a fall from Grace when he becomes aware of
himself as a body (i.e. a mind that is a body); if James’ father sees himself like “a boneless
Christ,” it is because he, much like the crucified Christ atoning for the sins of mankind, now
suffers the consequences of his own fall.

4. A Close Reading Continued: The Problem of Self-consciousness at ETA
James Incandenza apparently takes his father’s lesson to heart, because he hires Gerhardt
Schtitt to run the tennis program at ETA, a program generally understood among ETA personnel
as “a progression toward self-forgetting” (635).
Schtitt’s program is basically designed to condition players psychologically, so they will
not fall victim to the same kind of self-conscious introspection that got the best of James’s father;
although couched in different terms, the ethos at ETA is still basically the same as the one
outlined above: keep head is body: look past yourself and see only the game.
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Schtitt believes that whether a player wins or loses a match is mostly determined by the
player’s state of mind, whether he (the player) can stay focused on the game at hand and not get
distracted by things he finds interesting, alluring, bothersome, painful, or irritating. At morning
drills in the November cold, Schtitt provides a long list of things the players might find
distracting on any given day, which includes:
Cold. Hot. Wet and dry. Very bright sun and you see the purple dots. Very bright
hot and you have no salt. Outside is wind, the insects which like the sweat. Inside
is smell of heaters, echo, being jammed in together, tarp is overclose to the
baseline, not enough of room bells inside clubs which ring the hour loudly to
distract, clunk of machines vomiting sweet cola for coins. […] Opponent’s
relatives heckle, opponent cheats. You hurt. You have the injury. Bad knee and
back. Hurt groin area from not stretching as asked. Aches of elbow. Eyelash in
eye. The throat is sore. A too pretty girl in audience, watching. (459)
For Schtitt, a distracted player is basically a weak-willed player, a player stuck inside his head.
To overcome distractedness the player must overcome himself—he must put aside his petty
concerns, doubts, and fears. In this way, he explains to Mario, “[t]he true opponent, the enfolding
boundary, is the player himself. Always and only the self out there, on court, to be met, fought,
brought to the table to hammer out terms” (84).
The player learns to overcome himself by finding refuge in what Schtitt terms a “second
world,” a metaphorical world the player steps into every time he steps onto the tennis court, a
world sheltered from distractions, where the player finds “purpose past sluggardly self and
complaints about uncomfort” (459). Distractedness in this instance seems to be (at least for
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Schtitt) a function of self-centeredness. Entering the second world is thus an act of self-denial
(i.e. a kind of self-forgetting): the player’s self does not get what it immediately wants.
Schtitt believes the way you direct a player’s focus, the way you teach him to enter into
this second world, is by giving him something greater than him to focus on, i.e. something
greater than him (and his immediate needs) to care about. “These kids,” DeLint notes in his
conversation with Steeply, “they’re here to get lost in something bigger than them. […] To forget
themselves as objects of attention for a few years and see what they can do when the eyes are off
them” (660). By caring about something other than himself—by getting “lost in something
bigger,” i.e. something meaningful—the player no longer notices (read: cares about) peripheral
distractions.5
Reporters are therefore never allowed to interview ETA students, because ETA is “about
seeing instead of being seen” (660). Because, when players make it to professional tennis, they
are seen plenty—they are idolized, in a way—and are effectively turned into what DeLint terms
“statues”—“to be looked at and poked at and discussed, and then some.” This is dangerous,
because very often such players come to believe they are the statue, and when the statue
inevitably crumbles, that is, when the players’ fame has run its course—“when they start to stop
getting poked at or profiled, when their blossom starts to fade” (661)—they psychologically
disintegrate; they do not know who they are apart from the statue.

To be sure, this “something bigger” is, to my knowledge, never clearly defined, but the point, I
think, is that the player will only overcome herself if she believes (or even if she just senses) that
by doing so she will achieve, obtain, or be-part-of something worthwhile in the end. “Any
something,” Schtitt tells Mario, “The What: this is more unimportant than that there is
something” (83).
5
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To overcome oneself in this way is very hard, particularly for American teenagers. Schtitt
explains to Mario that an ethos of self-denial does not jive with a “U.S. of modern A.” that
teaches boys to care only about themselves, to care only about pursuing “this flat and shortsighted idea of personal happiness: ‘The happy pleasure of the person alone, yes?” (83). This is
why Schtitt’s program is so rigorous; it is also, I think, why he resembles and sounds like a
German military drill sergeant: if an ETA player wants to be successful at a sport that is at its
roots “self-competitive” (84), he must learn to starve his distinctly American self of what it
usually wants—attention, satisfaction, pleasure, ease, etc.—which requires a daily training
regimen.6 Schtitt and his program are therefore notably juxtaposed with the American way:
The thing with Schtitt: like most Europeans of his generation, anchored from
infancy to certain permanent values which—yes, OK, granted—may admittedly,
have a whiff of proto-fascist potential about them, but which do, nevertheless (the
values), anchor nicely the soul and course of a life—Old World patriarchal stuff
like honor and discipline and fidelity to some larger unit—Gerhardt Schtitt does
not so much dislike the modern O.N.A.N.ite U.S. of A. as find it hilarious and
frightening at the same time. […] Schtitt was educated in the pre-Unification
Gymnasium under the rather Kanto-Hegelian idea that jr. athletics was basically
just training for citizenship, that jr. athletics was about learning to sacrifice the hot
narrow imperatives of the Self—the needs, the desires, the fears, the multiform

He is, in a way, teaching them to hope. That is, he is teaching (read: habituating) them to look
past themselves when met with adversity, to transcend their present discomforts and
disappointments in order to see only the game.
6
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cravings of the individual appetitive will—to the larger imperatives of a team
(OK, the State) and a set of delimiting rules (OK, the Law). (82)
It is significant that Schtitt’s values “whiff of proto-fascist potential.” If a distracted
player is a weak-willed player, a player who is basically a slave to “the multiform cravings of the
individual appetitive will,” Schtitt’s program is supposed to help strengthen the player’s will, so
he (the player) can overcome these cravings. But in overcoming these cravings the player
overcomes himself. This is a willful act of self-denial, a limit imposed on an American self that
(supposedly) wants to be limitless and free.
To the extent that Schtitt’s conspicuously fascist-leaning tennis program is effective, it
implicitly critiques the American way; it also recalls the paternalism invoked in the Marathe/
Steeply conversation from section 1. To be sure, I am not suggesting that Wallace endorses
fascism here, but I do think he wants to challenge a modern American sensibility that rejects
“Old World” values—what the especially cynical might term “proto-fascist” values—outright.
That is, if the “Old World” has these supposedly illiberal values—“honor and discipline and
fidelity to some larger unit”—which nevertheless happen to “anchor nicely the soul and course
of a life,” and which apparently make the one who holds these values receptive to athletic
coaching and character formation, it is not clear whether the New World of Infinite Jest’s
“O.N.A.N.ite. U.S. of A.,” having apparently dispensed with these values, has its own values that
can do the same (i.e. “anchor nicely the soul and course of a life”). To the extent that Schtitt’s
program at ETA is coextensive with ETA itself, ETA represents a vestige of this Old World,
where the players have relatively little freedom but plenty of meaningful work.
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Fascism is notably referenced elsewhere in the novel. The narrator notes that AA’s root
axiom, that there are “no whys or wherefores allowed. In other words check your head at the
door,” is “almost classically authoritarian, maybe even proto-Fascist” (374). In other words, AA
is a program of self-surrender 7—as the narrator notes, it only works if the addict is truly willing
to do whatever the program dictates:
If you don’t want to do as you’re told—I mean as it’s suggested you do—it means
that your own personal will is still in control, and Eugenio Martinez over at Ennet
House never tires of pointing out that your personal will is the web your Disease
sits and spins in, still. The will your call your own ceased to be yours as of who
knows how many Substance-drenched years ago. It’s now shot through with the
spidered fibrosis of your Disease. His own experience’s term for the Disease is:
The Spider. You have to Starve The Spider: you have to surrender your will. […]
You have to want to surrender your will to people who know how to Starve the
Spider. (357)
But if AA is “proto-Fascist,” it is not necessarily ill conceived; after all, in the course of the novel
AA mostly works, if not for all of the addicts then certainly for Don Gately (at least up until the
novel’s ending with him in the hospital bed, after which point the reader decides whether he
finally breaks and takes the hospital’s morphine). The program’s effectiveness thus

When Marathe interviews at Ennet House masquerading as an addict the narrator notes that
Marathe and Fortier learned, while preparing for the ruse, “that U.S.A. recovery from the
addictions was somewhat paramilitary in nature”; so, when Pat Montesian makes an offhand
reference to prayer Marathe readily volunteers, “I will attempt to pray at a moment’s
order” (749). AA is thus linked to military training regimens, and military training regimens are
linked to Schtitt, and Schtitt is linked to fascism.
7
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problematizes a claim modern liberalism generally takes for granted, that maximizing personal
freedom maximizes personal happiness.
Fascism is also referenced during Marathe and Steeply’s conversation in Tucson that I
referenced in the opening section. Marathe wonders if Americans really understand how delayed
gratification works, because practicing it requires a level of self-control he thinks Americans are
never taught. To which Steeply responds:
But see that here it can’t be a Fascist matter of screaming at the kid or giving him
electric shocks each time he overindulges in candy. You can’t induce a moral
sensibility the same way you’d train a rat. The kid has to learn by his own
experience how to learn to balance the short-and long-term pursuit of what he
wants. (429)
So Steeply believes self-control is something one learns by trial and error; one only needs to be
given the freedom to work it out. “This is the crux of the educational system you find so
appalling,” he tells Marathe, “Not to teach what to desire. To teach how to be free. To teach how
to make knowledgeable choices about pleasure and delay and the kid’s overall down-the-road
maximal interests” (429).
But if Steeply is correct about this, the samizdat he and his colleagues are searching for
should not be dangerous; as Marathe notes, the samizdat is only dangerous if the American
people actually lack self-control:
How could it be that A.F.R. malice could hurt all of the U.S.A. culture by making
available something as momentary and free as the choice to view only this one
Entertainment? You know there can be no forcing to watch a thing. If we
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disseminate the samizdat, the choice will be free, no? Free from force, no? Yes?
Freely chosen? (430)
But, of course, the samizdat is dangerous; everyone that looks at it cannot turn away. If
Marathe’s position smacks of proto-fascism he is not necessarily wrong. Conversely, if Steeply is
supposed to be championing American freedom he is not necessarily right.

5. What is Wrong With Hal? Another Close Reading
As I noted above, the novel’s opening episode, in which Hal suffers an apparent, but
inexplicable, 8 breakdown during his interview at the University of Arizona, is chronologically
the novel’s final episode.
In the lead up to Hal’s breakdown, a critical event is the meeting in Tavis’ office, to
which he, Pemulis, Axford, and Kittenplan are summoned after the Eschaton debacle. A urologist
is there to administer a surprise drug test, which Pemulis gets pushed back a month, but Hal will
only pass the test if he stops smoking marijuana. This is significant, because at this point Hal
“hasn’t gone over twenty-four hours without getting high in secret for well over a year” (1052).
His quitting marijuana has a direct effect on him when, only the next day, he nearly loses a match
to Ortho Stice; afterwards at dinner Hal admits that he feels like—and on the court earlier with
Stice, felt like—a different person, “a whole new and chemical-free Hal who should by all rights
have lost to a 16-year-old out there in public on what ended up a gorgeous NNE autumn
Hal’s admission interview reads like a scene from a Kafka story; something supernatural seems
to be either affecting Hal directly or distorting how he appears to others, and at this point in the
novel the reader has no idea why. As Dulk suggests, by opening the novel with this scene, “[t]he
question ‘What happened to/is wrong with Hal?’” becomes “one of Infinite Jest’s main narrative
threads, to which “the novel offers no explicit answer” (217).
8
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day” (635). If chemical-free Hal should have lost to Stice, it is because chemical-free Hal is
distracted, introspective, and morose; Stice later describes Hal as having played with “the wideeyed but unfocused look of a tennis player right on the verge of falling apart out there, and yet
strangely affectless, as if deep inside some well of his own private troubles” (637).
Hal’s near-loss to Stice underscores his dependence on marijuana: he looses focus, and
thus underperforms, when he plays without it in his system—which is perhaps counterintuitive
(marijuana is not usually touted as a performance enhancing drug), but it is still the case. DeLint
explains to Steeply that Hal’s main weakness as a player is that he easily becomes discouraged.
Unlike Wayne who is “pure force,” who can easily move on (psychologically speaking) after
losing a point, Hal cannot:
Hal remembers points, senses trends in a match. […] Hal’s susceptible to
fluctuations. Discouragement. Set-long lapses in concentration. Some days you
can almost see Hal like flit in and out of a match, like some part of him leaves and
hovers and then comes back. (682)
Hal is basically an overly self-conscious tennis player: if Hal naturally “remembers points”—that
is, if he dwells too much on his mistakes—getting high helps him forget them. Hal thus uses
marijuana for the same reason his father and grandfather used alcohol: to forget.
Stice’s own experience during, and then after, the game strongly and tellingly contrasts
with Hal’s. At dinner Stice stares at a tomato stuck to the inside wall of his salad bowl:
His cheeks are ballooned with food as he stares at the perched tomato, trying to
respect this object with all his might, summoning the sort of coercive reverence
he’d felt this P.M. as several balls’ sudden anomalous swerves against wind and
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their own vectors half convinced Stice they’d become sensitive to his inner will,
at crucial times. (637)
The mystical connection Stice thinks he established with the ball during the match—that the ball
had been “sensitive to his inner will”—directly recalls James Incandenza’s father’s words to
James in section two: “touch things with consideration and they will be yours; you will own
them; they will move or stay still or move for you.” This suggests that, at least on a textual level,
the mystical connection he had with the ball was real; Stice played so well, because Stice was/is
an analog of James’s father before his fall—that is, Stice was playing unself-consciously, abiding
(though unwittingly, it seems) by the head is body creed.
The text suggests a colloquial term for this phenomenon, when many of Stice’s
classmates, seeing him stare at the bowl, “interpret his intense distraction as Stice’s still being in
the magic can’t-miss Zone from this P.M.’s match” (635). The “Zone” is referenced elsewhere in
the novel, when Hal is shooting his toenail clippings into a wastebasket that sits across the room.
He tells Orin on the phone that he is “shooting seventy-plus percent,” which to Hal feels almost
supernatural: “It’s just like that magical feeling on those rare days out there playing. Playing out
of your head, deLint calls it. Loach calls it The Zone. Being in The Zone. Those days when you
feel perfectly calibrated” (242). Because being in The Zone happens to a person unintentionally,
Hal worries that thinking about it too much will undo it—but of course once he starts thinking
about it he cannot stop (248). Having lost confidence in his ability to keep the shooting streak
alive, he sits frozen, too scared of missing on his next shot to even try—“This is why Pemulis
and Troeltsch always seem to let a lead slip away,” he tells Orin, “The standard term is
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Tightening up. The clippers are poised, blades on either side of the nail. I just can’t achieve the
unconsciousness to actually clip (249) (my emphasis).”

Conclusion
As I noted in the opening section, tracing the problem of self-consciousness through the
course of the novel is helpful because it sheds light on Hal’s bizarre reaction during his
admission interview, which is, chronologically, the novel’s final episode.
Hal quits smoking marijuana on November 10, Year of the Depend Adult Undergarment
(Y.D.A.U.). His admission interview is a year later, sometime in November, Year of Glad. The
only times Hal shows up in the novel between these two points are on November 11 Y.D.A.U.,
the day he plays Stice in the exhibition match, the following day, November 12, the day he and
Pemulis discuss his addiction concerns, and then the following week on November 20, when Hal
wakes before 5:00 am and finds Stice with his tongue frozen to the window. This means almost a
year of Hal’s life is unaccounted for in the lead up to his admission interview. It is therefore
telling that soon after Hal begins withdrawing from marijuana he experiences physical symptoms
that still persist at the time of his interview. Burn notes,
[A]s the effects of Hal's withdrawal worsen, his face begins to resemble an
unreliable mask, assuming “various expressions ranging from distended hilarity to
scrunched grimace . . . that seemed unconnected to anything that was going
on” (p. 966), and he loses control of the tone of his voice, though he is, at this
point, still able to communicate. (36)
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This is not to say that marijuana withdrawal is the only thing affecting Hal during his interview,
but it is an important piece to the puzzle; it connects his suffering with the suffering of his father
and his father’s father; because like his father and his father’s father, it seems that he—if his
“waggling” (14) (i.e., his bodily convulsions) is any indication—cannot forget (read: escape)
himself.
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